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Abstract. For many reasons, dollarization is an efficient and realistic option for this country. 
Yet, in order to last, it must be able to withstand banking panics without the assistance of a 
conventional lender of last resort and the lobby of protected industries to revoke dollarization. 
To this end, we advance a model of commercial banking close to that of Panama, under foreign 
law, and argue for free trade agreements with superpowers to smooth out real-exchange rate 
fluctuations.  
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1. Introduction 
he history of Argentina’s monetary and macroeconomic instability is 
long and known by all; its efficiency cost defies imagination (Ávila, 
2011). Instability was high in 1975 (fiscal and balance-of-payments 
crisis), higher in 1989/90 (hyperinflation), and even higher in 2001/02 (banking 
panic and debt default). The sharp run from Central Bank peso notes towards 
the dollar in 2018 is a piece of evidence that Argentina keeps being a de-facto 
dollarized country. 
In the 70s anti-inflationary policies hinged on fixing the foreign-exchange 
rate through administrative decisions taken by the Minister of Finance. In the 
face of growing loss of credibility, in the 80s anti-inflationary policies started 
to demand explicit backing of the President of the Nation. In the 90s 
Convertibility required passing a law by Congress. Nowadays a credible peso 
fixing would require dollarizing the country. Dollarization is defined as the 
unilateral substitution of reserve money (US dollar, Euro) for the national 
currency. 
This is an odd country. On the one hand, it works under a currency 
substitution system;1 on the other, its economy is ruled by the country-risk 
premium. Its Central Bank cannot issue reserve money and its Government 
cannot issue bonds AAA. So it does not have the necessary tools to carry 
counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies out. Argentina lacks credit in the 
broadest sense; it is a zero-trust country. 
 † Economics at the University of CEMA, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
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1 For us a system of currency substitution is the same as a dollarized system or a bimonetary 
system (peso/dollar). For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the Argentine system as a 
bimonetary one from now on. 
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Dollarization has become a real alternative because it is basically 
irreversible, because the cost of seigniorage is only a fraction of the benefit the 
country forgoes by keeping the peso, because an independent monetary policy 
does not have influence upon the real exchange rate and the business cycle, 
and because the inflation tax has been for a long time the basic source of 
financing of an expansive fiscal policy. 
A lasting dollarization should rest on two reforms: a) a new commercial 
banking system because from experience we think a dollarized Argentina 
would not support a six-month bank run; b) free trade agreements with 
superpowers because from experience we think a dollarized Argentina would 
not last ten years the complaints for losses of competitiveness coming from the 
protected industry. 
Section 2 introduces a plan for a lasting dollarization, which comprises four 
stages: conversion, dollarization, commercial banking reform, and trade 
liberalization anchored in free-trade agreements with superpowers. We 
emphasize at every step the need of irrevocable monetary, banking, and 
commercial arrangements. Section 3 attempts to answer various questions and 
criticisms to the plan. Section 4 focuses on the design of a model of 
commercial banking strong enough to keep the value of deposits safe. And 
Section 5 summarizes the main remarks. 
 
2. The Plan 
Back in 1960 former finance minister Federico Pinedo published a little 
book evaluating the performance of the Argentine economy in the preceding 
150 years. Among other remarks, he stressed the fact that the country had 
been especially prone to fiscal deficits and inflation. After adding the fiscal 
and monetary chaos of the following six decades to the picture, it is easy to 
realize that Pinedo had not seen anything yet. 
The very existence of a central bank leads to devaluation of the currency 
and inflation. It’s hard to reject this statement born of Argentine own 
economic history. Instead of new attempts to make the peso come back to life, 
we should do otherwise: substitute a World class currency for the peso. This 
amounts to dollarizing the economy through the unilateral adoption of the US 
dollar or the euro as this country’s legal currency. 
Dollarization so defined has benefits and problems. The former are huge 
and the latter, important. Among the problems, it’s usually said, dollarization 
carries political costs so great that efforts to that end are hopeless. I don’t 
know. People in Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama do not think so. Not either 
in Scotland, where they discuss the possibility of staying with the EU and 
keeping the pound sterling while the UK leaves the Union. This would also be 
another example of dollarization. 
Thanks to a first class currency Argentina would enjoy these benefits: no 
more currency devaluations or inflation; no more traumatic hot-money 
inflows or outflows; no more recurrent wage bargaining or labor strikes; no 
more power-tariff hikes or blackouts; no more price freezes or threats of 
expropriation, and no more embargoes on exports or imports. Although it’s 
J.C. Avila, TER, 6(3), 2019, p.218-231. 
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hard to believe, each of these shocking events has to some extent a monetary 
cause. So big and ignored are the damages that a poor quality currency like 
the peso can inflict on the national economy. 
A lasting dollarization process covers from the short to the long run. We 
identify four main stages. 
First stage: Conversion of monetary and non-monetary liabilities of the 
Central Bank. The former are the monetary base and the latter, the interest-
bearing peso notes issued by the Central Bank. The conversion exchange rate 
equals the quotient of liabilities and international reserves. Investors make this 
calculation daily since the early 1980s. The conversion exchange rate would be 
lower if a) excluding part of the stock of peso notes was not risky for monetary 
stability, or b) increasing the stock of international reserves without 
compromising the public-debt service was possible. With full conversion of 
the Central Bank’s monetary and non-monetary liabilities, the peso short-run 
interest rate would fall to the level of the three-month American-bond rate, 
plus the expected rate of devaluation of the peso with respect to the dollar, the 
Central Bank may choose not to roll over its non-monetary liabilities, and no 
foreign-exchange crisis should occur. Thus the inflation rate would start to 
decline till vanishing in three-year time more or less. 
Second stage: But in order to build the Argentine economy edifice we need 
a fixed price of the dollar for the indefinite future. Two conditions: fixed price 
and indefinite future. Conversion provides a fixed price. But since the demise 
of Convertibility Law in 2002 this regime lacks the essential credibility to 
provide time perspective. The answer is dollarization due its irreversibility. 
We talk about irreversibility in probabilistic terms since the likelihood of de-
dollarization is quite low. Expected devaluation would then vanish and the 
short-run peso interest rate would fall to the level of the three-month 
American-bond interest rate. 
Passing from Conversion to Dollarization should take no more than six 
months since the latter gives a time horizon to the former. In this time span 
Government would convert banking deposits and Central Bank notes into 
dollars at the Conversion exchange rate, and offer the public the conversion of 
their currency holdings at the same exchange rate, while proceeding to import 
the needed quantities of coins and small-denomination bills. 
Third stage: An ordinary dollarization is a ticket to a banking panic. There 
exists certain relationship between a fixed exchange policy (of which 
dollarization is an extreme type) and banking panics since dollarization leaves 
commercial banking without a last resort lender. This is the first problem we 
have to solve in order to get a durable dollarization. Without solving it, the 
interest rate on the ten-year dollar denominated Argentine bond would not 
fall and the dollarization attempt would be a failure. Be aware of the fact that 
this rate governs spending in the national jurisdiction (Ávila, 2010). 
The Federal Reserve System is not the last resort lender in Ecuador, El 
Salvador, and Panama. To solve the problem the first two countries 
established high reserve ratios on deposits and asked commercial banks to 
create liquidity funds; so far, they have been successful. The task of the 
J.C. Avila, TER, 6(3), 2019, p.218-231. 
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Central Banks in these countries is a modest one; it consists of coordinating 
and supervising the activities of commercial banks. If Scotland decided to 
maintain the pound sterling without a previous agreement with the Bank of 
England, it would follow the same path. In turn, Panama put in practice in 
1970 a banking model highly integrated with international capital markets. It 
works successfully under national law, without reserve requirements or 
liquidity funds. But in view of the long history of contractual violations and 
institutional reversion, such solutions do not seem appropriate for a country 
like Argentina. In the middle of a financial crisis, the probability that the 
government of this country arbitrarily puts bonds on bank reserves and 
liquidity funds, or repudiate national law, is really high. 
There are other ways to make up for the last resort lender. Let’s consider 
two of them. The Simons proposal: consists of dividing commercial banks in 
two parts; a monetary store that takes in current account deposits under 100% 
reserve ratio and offers liquidity services, and an investment bank that, 
instead of taking in time deposits, issues security shares and invests in assets 
the value of which fluctuates in the Stock Exchange. In this fashion the 
proposal eliminates the perverse asymmetry affecting the nominal values of 
assets and liabilities of traditional banking, and affords a stable system 
without the help of a lender of last resort. This is not however a wise solution. 
Since the monetary store would work under Argentine jurisdiction the 
probability that Government put forcefully a bond on its reserves is really 
high (Ávila, 2004). 
The next proposal is risk-free. There’s no chance that Government 
arbitrarily puts bonds on banks reserves and there’s no chance that a banking 
panic could happen. Think of an internationalized system of commercial 
banks. Resident banks would continue to offer traditional capital-market 
services though they will not receive deposits or give loans on their own but 
on account of prestigious foreign banks. Deposits and loans would remain 
under the jurisdiction of the Central Banks to which the foreign banks report. 
So those central banks would become lenders of last resort of resident 
commercial banking under foreign law. Since the cost of repudiating of an 
arrangement under foreign law is bigger than that of repudiating an 
arrangement under national law, this banking organization would have a 
better chance to live on and help to lower country risk (Ávila, 2004). 
This problem demands decisive action. The second and third stages should 
be treated as one. 
Fourth stage: We have to face a couple of additional problems in order to 
build a lasting dollarization. The first one relates to likely difficulties to place 
new sovereign debt, and the second to claims for so called losses of 
competitiveness. 
For a country without an issuing bank it might be more difficult to place 
sovereign debt. The bond holder may feel more exposed to default risks and 
ask for higher yields when he knows Government cannot print money. There 
are a couple of tools to address this situation: a) external contingent credit; b) 
fiscal surplus. To the best of our knowledge, there is not a good solution for 
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this problem because there is not an arrangement with low probability of 
reversal. 
If the absence of a lender of last resort can be fatal in the short run, the 
claims for losses of competitiveness of the protected industry can be corrosive 
in the long run. A durable dollarization will lower significantly the long-run 
interest rate and bring abundant credit while the country gets more expensive. 
We have two powerful tools to counteract this phenomenon: a) open up the 
economy, that is to say raise exports and imports as a fraction of GDP; b) 
reduce the size of Government, that is to say lower public spending as a 
fraction of GDP. 
We think there is no way to effectively open the economy up without 
turning to free-trade agreements with superpowers. Trade liberalization 
generates a new relative-price structure. In particular, it raises the price of 
export goods thus fostering a reallocation of capital, labor and entrepreneurial 
capacity from the protected sector to the unprotected one, and meanwhile 
creates an attractive environment for foreign direct investment. But if 
entrepreneurs and investors perceived the new price structure as temporary, 
the economy would get bogged down in the mud. Because of the expected 
policy reversal, protected industry stagnates, unemployment rises, investment 
is delayed, and exports languish. Signing free-trade agreements with 
superpowers is an efficient escape from this situation due to their low 
probability of repudiation. If the trade liberalization policy could not be 
anchored in this manner, the best thing is not to open the economy at all. In 
view of the high probability that the Argentine government will be the first to 
request an exception to the rule, the economy would get bogged down and the 
agreements would fall in public disrepute (Ávila, 2015: chap. II). 
Let us explain how the forces unleashed by the opening up lead to a 
cheapening of the country, a so called competitive gain. As we know, the 
capital-account balance must be equal to the current-account balance with 
opposite sign. Assume no net capital inflows so that the current-account 
balance is zero. The opening up takes place. Thus the price of imported goods 
goes down while import spending goes up. But the current-account balance 
must always be zero. So exports grow proportionally. Exports grow because 
the price of services (non-traded goods) goes down. That is to say the country 
gets cheaper. This phenomenon makes stronger the rise of the relative price of 
exportable production aforementioned. 
Reducing the size of Government makes cheaper the country in a direct 
way. Given that public spending is composed mainly of wages (teachers, 
policemen) and public works, its reduction implies a contracted demand for 
services in general, and an additional cheapening. Labor deregulation, 
infrastructure investment and removing distorting taxes are important 
reforms. But when public spending increases too much and the economy is 
rather closed to international trade their influence become nil. 
As investors check progress in the third and four stages, the Argentine risk 
premium will move downwards to the Chilean risk premium. A steady 
process of direct foreign investment, export expansion, and economic growth 
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will follow the reduction of Argentine risk. Concrete outcomes will take time, 
no less than three or four presidential terms. 
The first stage has no purpose without the second. The second stage 
without the third is dangerous. And the third stage without the fourth is 
naïve, and ill-fated for the ideal of a fully integrated country to World trade 
and capital markets. 
This is our economic argument for dollarizing Argentina. Now politicians 
should weigh pros and cons. 
 
3. The ABC of lasting dollarization 
The purpose of this section is to answer or comment various questions and 
criticisms to our Plan. Some passages repeat arguments developed before for 
the benefit of clarity. 
1. What do we mean by dollarization? 
It’s the unilateral adoption of a reserve currency. In practice, only two 
currencies enter this category: the US dollar and the euro. 
2. Are there many dollarized countries? 
There are many de-facto dollarized countries. Think of countries whose 
dollar-monetary assets represent a large fraction of total monetary assets. In 
2000, after a long decade of monetary stability, Argentina ranked 4th in a list of 
dollarized countries, below Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Russia (Ávila, 2004). 
Nevertheless, when talking about dollarization we usually think of de-jure, 
full or official dollarization. There were 35 officially dollarized countries in 
2002. Ecuador, Panama, and El Salvador stand out when measured in terms of 
GDP. Ecuador’s GDP represents 20% of the Argentine GDP; Panama’s 10%, 
and El Salvador’s 5%.2 Kosovo’s and Montenegro’s GDP are smaller, and they 
opted for the euro. The remaining countries are micro-states (Hanke, 2002; 
Jácome & Lönnberg, 2009). 
3. What reasons led them to be dollarized? 
Panama got dollarized due to a historical accident. El Salvador, to lower 
interest rates, spur foreign direct investment and also because it was the next 
logical step in its program of economic reform. After leaving old Yugoslavia, 
Kosovo and Montenegro adopted the German mark because it was a better 
currency than the dinar, and as soon as Germany substituted the euro for the 
German mark they did the same. Finally, Ecuador got dollarized due to a 
banking crisis and after a bout of high inflation (almost 100% per year). None 
of these countries needed a megacrisis like those affecting Argentina since the 
Rodrigazo, in 1975, to be dollarized. 
4. Why should Argentina be dollarized? 
Because Argentina has attempted unsuccessfully to survive with de-facto 
dollarization for the last 35 years. The volatility of velocity of circulation is a 
salient feature of a de-facto dollarized, bimonetary economy. This means that 
portfolio changes from national money to reserve money, whatever the 
motive, could be sudden, frequent, and massive, implying a well-known row 
2 Own estimates based on International Financial Statistics 2016. 
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of maxi-devaluations, inflation hikes, capital outflows, and recession (Ávila, 
2004). For this reason we claim that a policy of floating-exchange rate is a 
dangerous thing for this country. 
To deal with a bimonetary economy the exchange rate must be fixed. 
Convertibility did so. Yet this regime has a flaw: it can be revoked without 
paying a significant cost. Conversely, dollarization faces a high cost of 
repudiation which makes dedollarization unlikely. There are no examples of 
reversals of official dollarizations. Liberia, at the end of WWII, might be an 
exception but we lack enough information to make sure. 
5. Which are the benefits of dollarization? 
The benefits are the misfortunes the country will avoid: foreign-exchange 
runs, inflation and hot-money flows; recurrent wage bargaining and strikes, 
power-tariff hikes and blackouts, price freezes and expropriation threats, 
export and import embargoes. To some extent, all this damage is the 
consequence of a low quality currency. 
Another benefit is the instantaneous fall of the short-run interest rate (3 to 6 
months). The fall of the long-run interest rate is another story. This one 
depends on the country risk premium, which, in turn, depends on issues like 
the fiscal deficit, the ratio of public debt to exports, the stability of the banking 
system, and the degree of trade openness. In other words, the fall of the long-
term interest rate depends on important reforms in the fields of public finance, 
banking and international trade that would finish up official dollarization. 
6. Two additional benefits 
Dollarization would soften financial stress. Notice that the Argentine 
Treasury’s bill for debt interests jumped from 2.3% of GDP to 4% last year as a 
result of a big devaluation. Dollarization would contribute to financial 
stability.  
Since the dollar circulating in the cities of Rosario and Mar del Plata would 
be the same as the dollar circulating in New York and San Francisco, the new 
currency will not be subject to devaluation. Therefore we would not 
experience sudden hikes in food prices and jumps of the level of poverty. 
Dollarization would contribute to political stability. 
7. Dollarization deprives Argentina of seigniorage revenue 
Not a strong argument. What is the opportunity cost of seigniorage 
revenue? To retain this revenue we should continue to deal with the peso, 
which has proven to be, once and again, a poor currency. The forgone benefits 
of not dollarizing are the opportunity cost of the peso. We find it hard to 
believe that the opportunity cost of the peso is smaller than seigniorage 
revenue in an economy marked by stagnation and demonetization since the 
1970s. 
8. Dollarization lacks a last resort lender 
In the previous section we reviewed the solution that Ecuador and El 
Salvador found to deal with this problem. We said that that solution is not 
advisable for Argentina for its long history of contractual violations and 
institutional reversions. In other words, the probability that a Government in 
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the middle of a financial crisis will put a bond forcibly into bank reserves or 
liquidity funds, thus unleashing banking panic is too high. 
Panama found an interesting solution. A new model of commercial 
banking was set up in 1970. It works under national law, without liquidity 
funds or reserves requirements. It is highly integrated with World capital 
markets and has been very successful so far. Yet this solution is not advisable 
for Argentina. The probability of repudiation of this type of banking 
legislation is as high as that of a new Convertibility law. 
It’s better to consider a commercial banking system under foreign law. 
Banks from abroad would establish branches in the country instead of limited 
liability companies. The branches would lend money to resident as well as 
foreign customers without any regulatory bias, in order to diversify risks and 
stabilize the value of deposits. Branches’ balance sheets would merge with 
those of their headquarters, so that possible branches’ losses are covered by 
their headquarters as in Panama. In turn, local banks in association with 
prestigious international banks would qualify to receive deposits and give 
loans on account of their foreign partners. This arrangement aims at three 
goals: a) commercial banking is safe from forced placement of bonds by 
Government; b) international banks take over the role of lender of last resort 
of commercial banking, employing to that end their own funds or those 
provided by their Central Banks; c) the cost of repudiation of banking 
legislation is high. A new commercial banking model like this one would have 
a higher probability to endure and help reduce country risk (Ávila, 2004). 
9. Dollarization is a rigid system, so it is a bad policy. 
It’s not easy to understand the accurate meaning of this mantra repeated by 
99% of my colleagues. They may be afraid of any of the following restrictions: 
a) the possibility of melting down a wage rise above productivity is no longer 
available; b) the same for the possibility of melting down a hike in public 
spending; c) the same for the possibility of foreign-exchange fine tuning; d) 
the possibility of adjusting to changes in capital flows is limited. 
The first restriction is true. Government would somehow lose degrees of 
freedom in this aspect. In a dollarized economy, business and trade unions 
will have to set wages at a level consistent with a currency that cannot be 
devalued. If they made a mistake, they would pay for it through recession and 
unemployment. But only the first time, since the second time they will know 
how the system works. Of course, dollarization needs some degree of 
decentralized wage bargaining. 
On the second restriction, international evidence teaches us that 
dollarization generates a bias towards fiscal discipline (Jácome & Lönnberg, 
2009). Yet for Argentina this result may not be valid. As far as we know, there 
is no such thing as a fiscal arrangement with high cost of repudiation. 
Consequently, as long as banks do not fall and the currency is not devalued, 
we should accept an occasional sovereign default without dramatizing. 
On the third restriction, first let’s clarify the concept. A fine tuning policy 
consists of devaluing the currency a little bit in an economic downturn to put 
a limit to recession and deflation, and revaluing a little bit in an economic 
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boom to put a ceiling to an excessive expansion and inflation. We have read 
about fine-tuning experiences in other countries but we do not recall any 
Argentine experience in this respect; we cannot lose a tool that we never had. 
Nevertheless the fundamental argument against fine tuning is not historical 
but conceptual. From the macroeconomic standpoint, Argentina is a weird 
case. Besides having a bimonetary economy, its production and employment 
levels are determined by country risk. Fluctuations in the country risk 
premium determine the direction and magnitude of capital flows; fluctuations 
in capital flows determine in turn aggregate demand fluctuations, and 
aggregate demand fluctuations determine finally the business cycle (Ávila, 
2010). So we conclude that in the Argentine case fine tuning must be useless. 
On the fourth restriction, we should not bypass the fact that fluctuations of 
capital flows cause large real-exchange rate fluctuations. But we should not 
bypass another big fact: Argentina has one of the World closed economies. 
Openness to international trade has a macroeconomic dimension. Assume two 
identical countries producing each a $100,000 per-year GDP. The closed 
country exports $10,000 per year and imports the same value; the open 
country exports $30,000 per year and imports the same value. A crisis happens 
and the trade balance goes from zero to $4,000 per year to finance capital 
outflows. In the closed country exports increase to 11,000 and imports 
decrease to 7,000, while in the open country exports increase to 31,000 and 
imports decrease to 27,000. Thus while in the former case exports increase 10% 
and imports decrease 30%, in the latter exports increase 3% and imports 
decrease 10%. It’s not bold to state that the pressure to raise the real-exchange 
rate (lower the real-wage rate) must be stronger in the closed country than in 
the open one. Consequently, this pressure must be stronger in Argentina, 
where exports stand for 10% of GDP than in Chile, Mexico or Spain, where 
exports stand for more than 30%. 3  For a country characterized by wild 
fluctuations of the real-exchange rate, dollarizing without an ambitious and 
lasting opening to trade could be a failure in ten year-time. 
If Argentina had the power to issue reserve money and first-class sovereign 
debt, that is to say if the country had the capacity to apply classical 
countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies, it would be a waste of time to 
advise its dollarization. Now, taking into account that Argentina is a zero-
trust country, we find that an irreversible dollarization, as developed here, is 
the safest passageway to monetary stability and economic liberties, which are 
generally the first victims of instability. 
 
4. Re-shaping of commercial banking 
Argentina underwent a mild banking panic in 1980, a severe one in 1995, 
and a fatal one in 2001 (Ávila, 2004). None of them happened by chance. A 
common factor played a role: the combination of fractional reserves and a 
3The degree of openness of Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama is much greater than that of 
Argentina: 30%, 37% and 71% of GDP, respectively. Own estimates for the period 2005-2014 
based on International Financial Statistics 2016. 
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fixed exchange rate. But these two regimes are not compatible; they should 
not exist side by side. A country with a fixed-exchange rate is prone to 
banking panics. It’s easy to see why. 
By definition, with fractional reserves banks can convert just a fraction of 
their deposits into cash. Therefore, not to close their doors in the middle of a 
banking panic, they need a lender to discount illiquid assets. But discounting 
implies monetary expansion and, with a fixed-exchange rate, this leads to a 
balance-of-payments crisis. 
Dollarization is the extreme version of a fixed-exchange rate regime. The 
Central Bank, whose goal is to help banks as a last resort lender, simply 
disappears or is transformed into a banking superintendent. The challenge is 
to find a balance between dollarization and fractional reserve banking. The 
Simons proposal can be an alternative. Though if implemented it would 
radically change the present organization of commercial banking. We guess 
that’s why nobody has dared to do it so far (Ávila, 2004). 
Among the main dollarized countries, Ecuador and El Salvador came up 
with solutions which combine high fractional reserves and liquidity funds 
under the supervision of so called central banks.4 In turn, Panama applied a 
most interesting and innovative policy. In the next pages, we will review this 
policy and finally, building upon the Panamanian banking model, advance a 
proposal especially thought out for the Argentine case. 
Panama was born as an independent state in 1903. The next year the 
country adopted the American dollar as legal currency and two banks (one 
American and the other State-run) were established. The banking activity 
expanded freely in the country thanks to its comparative advantage as a 
bridge between North and South America. Towards the end of the 1960s, 
more than 100 banks functioned in Panama though they were not proper 
financial intermediaries. The banking law of 1970 was a landmark in the 
development of banking. Many institutions fell while the Government aimed 
at attracting prestigious international banks (Superintendency of Banks of 
Panama 2018). Those that remained and the new ones were organized in this 
fashion: 
* Towards year 2000, there were 59 banks with license to work in the 
domestic and the international markets; 28 with license to work in the 
international market exclusively, and one public bank, besides 14 
representative offices (Goldfajn & Olivares, 2000). 
* Banks can be national or foreign. And the latter can organize as branches 
or limited liability companies. 
* The balance sheets of the branches merge with those of their foreign 
headquarters. 
* Foreign headquarters may certify that branches fulfil the prudential 
regulations set by their governments, especially those referring to required 
minimum capital or solvency. This certificate is taken as valid by the 
Superintendency of Banks of Panama. 
4These fake institutions have no power to print money or control its quantity. 
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* Headquarters pay for loses of their branches just as the Buenos Aires 
headquarters of Argentine banks pay for loses of their provincial branches. 
* Established banks in the country can lend indifferently to local and 
foreign customers, without regulatory bias. Because of this feature 
Panamanian dollarization is known as a ‘dollarization with financial 
integration’ (Hanke, 2002; Moreno-Villalaz, 2005). Note that international 
diversification of bank assets helps stabilize the value of deposits. 
* The system works without legal reserve requirements, interbank liquidity 
funds and deposit insurance, and of course without the assistance of the 
Federal Reserve System as last resort lender. Should a bank close, customers 
with deposits up to $10,000 would have priority to withdraw their money. The 
IMF and other multilateral institutions have recommended some of the above 
mentioned prudential norms, yet fears of moral hazard would have prevailed. 
* The Superintendency of Banks demands two things basically: a) own 
capital must not be less than 8% of total bank assets, according to Basel rules; 
b) legal liquidity must not be less than 30% of net deposits. The latter are 
defined as total deposits minus deposits belonging to headquarters and other 
branches. 
* Legal liquidity can be made of: a) gold or legal currency; b) net balances 
in foreign banks already approved by the Superintendency, checking accounts 
or savings accounts for a period not exceeding 186 days; c) debt issued by 
foreign governments or multilateral financial institutions approved by the 
Superintendency, actively traded in the Stock exchange; d) national or foreign 
firms’ debt approved by the Superintendency, actively traded in the Stock 
exchange, with investment grade certified by a risk-rating agency of 
international renown, at market value; e) national Treasury notes and other 
Government debt with a maturity of no more than a year, at market value. 
The specialized literature does not record banking panics in Panama except 
for the crisis of 1987/89. At the Superintendency of Banks there are no 
memories of panics either, we were told. This is a striking fact for a country 
with no Central Bank. A good part of the explanation could be the blend of the 
legal liquidity requisite, the role of branches in the banking system, and the 
international diversification of loans. 
The origin of the 1987/89 banking crisis was political; it was a conflict 
between General Noriega and the U.S. government. Banks shut down for nine 
weeks and a half, the Panamanian government defaulted on its debt, and 
national GDP fell more than 15% (Moreno-Villalaz, 1999; Hanke, 2002). As 
time went by, commercial banking regained stability. Russia’s default in 1998 
and the sub-prime crisis in 2008 did not undermine it significantly. 
* Nowadays banking credit amounts to 90% of GDP. Out of this total, 98.4% 
goes to the private sector and the remaining 1.6% goes to the Government. 
The total does not include credit going to the rest of the World. It is worth 
noting that in Panama loans are divorced from deposits. Banks can lend over 
their deposits. 
* Mortgage credit amounts to 30% of GDP, at interest rates of 5/6% per year 
and for a term of 30 years. Personal consumption credit represents 21% of 
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GDP. And credit for retail business and construction average 13% of GDP 
each.5 
Once again, for dollarization to be enduring we should reorganize 
commercial banking. The Panamanian case is quite suggestive. Financial 
integration stands out. In spite of the ups and downs of this country’s life, 
commercial banking under national law has stayed integrated with World 
capital markets. 
The axis of the Argentine commercial banking organization should be the 
establishment of branches of prestigious international banks. Our model 
differs from the Panamanian model in three aspects: a) national banks should 
become partners of prestigious foreign banks to receive deposits and make 
loans on account of their international associates; b) commercial banking 
should remain under foreign law; c) given conditions a) and b), the legal 
liquidity requirement could be lower than in Panama. 
All discrimination of national banks is justified by the absence of a last 
resort lender. As regards the deposit-and-loan activity only, national banks 
would be a kind of branches of their foreign partners. This feature of the new 
organization would help to guarantee the stability of the banking system. And 
the substitution of foreign law for national law would bring the benefits of 
irreversibility we have emphasized in previous sections of this paper. 
Last but not least, we cannot overlook the fact that Panamanian banks have 
been able to keep the value of their deposits stable for decades. Nowadays, we 
are talking about $48 billion, a figure close to 60% of Argentine bank deposits. 
It is a great accomplishment. Think that the GDP of Panama is barely a tenth 
of that of Argentina.6 
 
5. Conclusion 
Much has been written on dollarization. Not much, if any, on lasting 
dollarization, by which we understand a regime strong enough to withstand 
banking panics and the lobby of protected industries in order to repudiate 
dollarization and devalue the currency. Considering the long history of 
monetary instability and institutional reversibility of Argentina, we have 
discussed the main steps for a durable dollarization of this country. The 
purpose of our plan is for investors to perceive the new regime as irrevocable 
so that the Argentine risk premium moves downwards to the Chilean risk 
premium. 
On irreversible reforms, by which we understand reforms with a high cost 
of reversion, we wrote somewhere else (Ávila, 2015). This time we provide 
examples and references of the operation of the banking and trade reforms. 
The most innovative part of the paper is Section 4, where we develop a 
banking model inspired by the experience of Panama. We call for branches of 
5Unless pointed out otherwise, information on the Panamanian banking system so far referred 
to was made available by J. Motta. 
6 Own estimates based on International Financial Statistics 2016 for Panama, and Informe 
Monetario 2018 for Argentina. 
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prestigious international banks to establish in the country under foreign law, 
and national banks to be partners of prestigious international banks in order 
to offer deposits and loans. 
Dollarizing with financial integration and free-trade agreements with 
superpowers will bring a degree of monetary and financial stability not seen 
by this country in a century. From which we expect a strong incentive to 
capital accumulation within the Argentine jurisdiction. 
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